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Abstract
This paper examines the degree of polarization of GDP per capita of African economies
between 1966 and 2008. Based on a nonparametric analysis, we find that countries tend to
cluster in two classes of per capita GDP. Relying on the Wolfson’s bipolarization measure,
the results reveal that bipolarization has been accelerating during the two first decades and
is still growing. We relate the evolution of polarization during the period to the business
sectors. We find that countries specialization is the driving force of this evolution, namely,
agriculture and industry sectors. We also study the innovation-development polarization
relation in a VAR framework using patents and trademarks as measures of innovation.
JEL: Polarization of GDP, patents, trademarks, VAR model
Keywords: C32, O34, O47, O55
∗This paper has immensely benefitted from the comments from editors. Helpful discussions with Pierre Mohnen
are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Corresponding author: Azomahou T.T., Tel. +31433884440, Fax +31433884499, E-mail: azoma-
hou@merit.unu.edu, M. Diene, mdiene@cres-sn.org
1
1 Introduction
The great advances recently made in economic growth theory, coinciding with the introduction
of endogenous growth models (Romer, 1986,1987), have led to a rising attention on the issue
of economic disparities. The models usually take into account other determinants of growth,
different from capital and labor, such as human capital, public expenditures (Lucas, 1988),
and innovations (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Economic growth theories enhanced by the
“new economic geography” models (Krugman, 1991, and Fujita and Thisse, 2002) show the
importance of spatial disparities in the convergence of economies. Usually, the sigma and beta
convergence developed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991,1992) are used for the analysis of the
disparities in per capita GDP in the literature. However, Quah (1993,1997) has shown that the
convergence methodologies lead to loss of information on the dynamics of income distribution.
For example, they cannot capture the changes of relative positions of countries over the period,
leaving behind the intra-group mobility.
Analysis of per capita convergence between countries has also been done by some scholars:
Lo´pez-Bazo et al. (1999), Cuadrado and Parellada (2002), Fingleton and Lo´pez-Bazo (2003),
Badinger et al. (2004), Magrini (2004), Miller and Genc (2005), and Meliciani (2006). Bernard
and Durlauf (1995) use annual logarithm of real output per capita for 15 OECD countries
and test the existence of convergence and common trends, from 1900 to 1987. There is a
convergence for a group of countries when they have identical either stochastic or deterministic
long-run trends, while common trends allow for proportionality of the stochastic elements. They
found that there is no convergence for the countries but evidence for common trends exists.
Bernard and Durlauf (1996), Quah (1996) and Anderson (2004) point out that the convergence
approaches also ignore the role of the polarization or formation of homogeneous groups within
the distributions. The natural clustering around stable steady state equilibria is identified as
the formation of “convergence clubs” (Quah, 1996, Baumol, 1986, Galor, 1996, Durlauf and
Jonhson, 1995).
Nevertheless, some important issues arise from the studies of convergence such as the ex-
istence of threshold effects (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990) or nonlinearity and parameter het-
erogeneity of human capital (Durlauf and Johnson, 1995, Masanjala and Papageorgiou, 2004,
Kalaitzidakis et al., 2001, Ketteni et al., 2007, Ketteni, 2009 and Mamuneas et al., 2006). As
regard nonlinearities, Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) notice that “though intuition and theories
point towards a positive effect of human capital on growth, the empirical evidence of the is-
sue is mixed”. So, the authors apply semi-parametric estimation techniques that investigate
nonlinearities in the relationship between economic growth and human capital (measured by
mean of years of schooling). They conclude that the link between the two variables is widely
nonlinear. Several empirical studies with different methodological approaches show strong evi-
dence of parameter heterogeneity (Durlauf and Johnson, 1995, Kalaitzidakis et al., 2001, Liu and
Stengos, 1999 and Durlauf et al., 2001). Parameter heterogeneity in growth models means, for
example, that in a cross-country growth regression, countries have different coefficient estimates
(Azariadis and Drazen, 1990, Durlauf, 1993, and Galor and Zeira, 1993).
The objective of this paper is to analyze the polarization of African economies, by using
various approaches. The first approach consists in the study of polarization in African countries’
per capita GDP distribution between 1966 to 2004. We primarily use a nonparametric analysis
and find that the countries tend to cluster in two classes of per capita GDP. Secondly, by using
the Wolfson’s bipolarization measure, the results reveal that bipolarization has been accelerating
during the two first decades and is still growing. We relate the evolution of polarization during
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the period to the business sectors. We find that the specialization of the countries is the main
factor explaining its evolution, namely, in agriculture and industry sectors.
In the second approach, we determine different types of economic polarization in Africa
by using the alienation-identification model developed by Duclos et al. (2004). We study a
particular form of polarization, based on the alienation that individuals or groups of individuals
feel toward each other. This alienation is reinforced by the sense of being within a group. Thus,
a distribution of living standards in a population is polarized if homogeneous different groups of
individuals are observed. These groups are spread around different modes and it is the case when
the population is divided into two groups around the median. This case is called bipolarization.
The literature is also interested in the formation of two groups, which is called bipolarization
(Foster and Wolfson, 1992, Wolfson, 1994, 1997, Wang and Tsui, 2000). These authors used
it formalized the polarization by dividing the population into two groups and the polarization
index increases when inequality of the average incomes of both groups increased.
The analysis of polarization has political and economic interest. First, it evaluates the risks
of interpersonal alienation between the individual groups, which can arise from a polarized
distribution. Alienation is the feeling of difference and exclusion, among individuals whose
living standards are not identical. Understanding the economic reasons of a polarized system
can facilitate the choice of the measures that policymakers can use to avoid social tensions. In the
literature, many authors have focused on the issue of polarization. Among them, are Esteban and
Ray (1994), Wolfson (1994), Wang and Tsui (2000), Zhang and Kanbur (2001) and Chakravarty
and Majumder (2001). Various measures of polarization are proposed, some of which are family-
based indices of entropy (Zhang and Kanbur, 2001), others on the deviation from the median
(Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). Duclos et al. (2004) have proposed a polarization measure that
combines the principles of identification and alienation. The sum of the antagonisms generated
by the two principles gives the polarization effect. Identification is the feeling of an individual
who sees himself as an element in a given group. Alienation is the result of the economic
resentment on other groups, mainly because of their different living standards. It is different
from the social alienation that is more general and that involves both socioeconomic and political
factors. For an individual, it means the lack of certain social criteria, compared to other members
of society (Bossert and d’Ambrosio, 2004, 2006).
The combination of income, to measure the polarization, is to make discrete elements of a
continuum, that is to say, to consider a finite and discrete groups. Generally, there is loss of
information on the distribution with the transition from a continuous to a discrete set of the
variable of interest (income or GDP for example). The classification of income is arbitrary and
the choice of the size of income groups also (Makdissi et al., 2008). The index of Duclos et al.
(2004) avoids these practical problems, by using density functions, as we shall see later.
Polarization and inequality are close, but they emphasize different aspects of a distribution,
and their changes can sometimes diverge for the same population. For example in a population
decomposed into two groups of different incomes, a reduction of the inequality in only one group,
creates a greater polarization of the population. Common features of studies on the formation
of groups, are based on the facts that: i) polarization implies the existence of two groups; ii)
polarization increases in the following two cases: inequality decreases within groups or increases
between the groups. Esteban and Ray (1994) propose a measure of polarization based on the
identification and alienation by introducing a set of axioms. They consider that polarization is
fundamentally linked to the ability of a society to undertake and promote collective decision-
making. In 1999, the authors develop a model of conflict where the level of polarization is related
to an equilibrium level of conflict. The polarization can also be applied to politics, as shown in
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the work of Schultz (1996) which, through a model of public goods, shows that the polarization
of the preferences of political parties led to an inefficient equilibrium.
All these studies suggest that the polarization can be approached in different ways and the
construction of indices depends on the axioms set forth. We will present the axioms that guide
the construction of the index of Duclos et al. (2004) that we use in this work. It is worth
to notice that many empirical studies have been devoted to the sources of polarization or the
same determinants of the variation in distances between the groups. Authors have studied
the microeconomic explanation of the polarization, analyzing possible sources of bias. We can
cite the work of Gradin (2000), polarization of income and its sources in Spain, D’Ambrosio
(2001) in Italy, Zhang and Kanbur (2001) in China. Duclos et al. (2004) have in turn provided
a measure of income polarization in 21 countries using data from the Luxembourg Income
Study. Similarly, Seshanna and Decornez (2003) have studied the distribution of income in many
countries. Ravallion and Chen (1997) evaluated the polarization of a group of 67 countries using
the index of Foster Wolfson.
Our paper examines the degree of economic polarization in Africa, using the per capita GDP
distribution. The relevance of the issue of polarization in Africa is mainly due to the necessity
of achieving economic and social cohesion in the context of the economic integration process
underway since the years of independence. It is then necessary to reduce the differences in
terms of development across the continent. This necessity may be seriously threatened if the
African Union (AU) and other regional integration institutions were to split into series of well-
differentiated economic clusters. We show that there exists a bipolarization of the economies
by using three methodologies. We primarily estimate non-parametrically the distribution of
the per capita GDP (we precisely use the GDP per capita in 2000 constant dollar terms) in
34 African countries, aiming to identify multimodality of the distributions, during the period
1966-2008. But the methodology does not give the precise measure of observed changes in the
degree of polarization over time. That is why we secondly analyze the evolution of Wolfson’s
bipolarization index during the period. We find that the global bipolarization is explained by the
polarization into four sectors: agriculture, mining, industries, and services. Lastly, we study the
innovation-development polarization relation in a VAR framework using patents and trademarks
as measures of innovation. By doing so, we are interesting in the relation between trademarks
and patents. Moreover, it is likely that catching-up economies experience an increase in trade-
mark applications prior to an increase in patent applications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the nonparametric analysis of the
distribution of per capita GDP in the African countries. In Section 3, we measure the degree of
bipolarization of the countries and examine the transitions of the economies during the period.
In Section 4, we analyze the polarization on other different variables and see how they contribute
to the GDP polarization in Africa. Section 5 offers a VAR analysis to quantify the determinants
of innovation indicators. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 A nonparametric analysis of GDP distribution
We examine the external shape of the GDP per capita distribution during the period 1966-
2008 for 34 countries. The data are drawn from the World Bank Africa Database (2007 and
2010). We exclude some countries due to data problems. To this end, we have estimated non-
parametrically, the density functions of the distribution under consideration. Estimates are
based on kernel functions, and in each case, the smoothing parameter is determined following
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Silverman (1986, p.48). The estimation results are presented in Figure 1 for the logarithm of
GDP per capita from 1996 to 2008. There appears to be different patterns in the evolution
of the African countries over time, and Figure 1 displays tendencies to cluster into relatively
homogenous classes, which are also commonly referred to as “convergence clubs” by Durlauf
and Johnson (1995) and Quah (1996,1997).
Insert Figure 1
Distribution of GDP per capita: Africa
As we can see, the African countries have evolved towards a twin-peak situation shown by
Quah (1996) for the world economy. The upper tail has stretched out further during the last two
decades. The distribution has also lost mass at the low end, particularly during the last period.
So, the poorest countries are not trapped in their relative GDP positions. The third mode that
becomes very apparent since 1966 begins to diminish continuously towards the end of the period.
From 1986 onwards, only a second mode emerged in all the estimated density functions. This
mode was formed by most developed countries, in the south and the north of Africa, such as
Morocco, Tunisia, and South Africa. This suggests that these countries are converging toward
a higher per capita GDP level than the others.
It is worth noting that the changes in the shape of the distribution of per capita GDP do not
derive from volatile movements, as shown by the fact that about three quarters of the countries
stay in their income class over a period of ten years, as shown in Table 1. It appears in the
transition probabilities that the countries in the third group are mainly located in the north and
the south of Africa, with some exceptions such as Gabon and Congo. In the first decades, some
countries such as Ivory Coast and Liberia left the second group for the less developed first one.
Other countries made transition from the first to the second group among them Egypt, Congo,
and Botswana.
Insert Table 1
Transition probability matrices
We make the assumption that the geographically contiguous countries form groups of coali-
tions that influence the overall polarization of the distribution. We have three coalitions: the
Maghreb countries, the south African countries and the sub-Saharan countries.
Insert Figure 2
Contour of distribution capita: Sub-sahara Africa
The contour plot of the Maghreb countries is given by the Figure 2a. During the first period,
from 1966 to 1990 they all grow but with a high dispersion. They converge at the second period.
The initial interval of variation of the countries’ relative GDP per capita is from 0.95 to 1.1.
In the last periods, from 2000, the interval reduces to 1.04 to 1.1. It means growth for some
countries and stagnation for the others. For the south African countries (Figure 2b), at the first
year (1966), there is a concentration between 0.75 and 1, of the relative GDP per capita. The
countries are divided into two groups after that year. The first one with four countries in the
interval 0.73 and 0.95 while the second one, with higher levels, is contained between 1.15 and
1.25. It appears in Figure 2c, for the sub-Saharan countries a clustering in two intervals. The
fist is from 0.71 to 1.05 and the second, from 1.2 to 1.3. A quasi stagnation distinguishes the
region from the other ones.
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3 Quantification of the level of polarization
The nonparametric and the transition approaches present the limitation that they do not provide
information about changes in the degree of polarization over time. To tackle this problem, we
use the methodology proposed by Wolfson (1994) in the literature on income distribution.
3.1 Economic bipolarization
Let F be an income distribution of N countries with a mean income value y¯ and a median
income value ym. The Wolfson’s bipolarization index, given for a population divided in two
groups by the median, is
W (F ) = 4
y¯
ym
[1− 2L(0.5)−G(F )] (1)
where G(F ) denotes the Gini coefficient of the income of the distribution F and L is the Lorenz
curve at the 50th population percentile. W (F ) is proportional to the shaded area in Figure 3.
The larger the shaded area, the fewer the countries with middle level GDP per capita, leading
to greater polarization. The area is also algebraically equal to the vertical distance between the
45-degree line and the Lorenz curve at the median percentile, L(0.5).
Insert Figure 3
Figure 4 presents the evolution of Wolfson’s bipolarization measure over time.
Insert Figure 4
Taking the study period as a whole, the results reveal an increase in the bipolarization of
the distribution under consideration. African countries are economically polarized, and there
appears to be an increase of the polarization during the first two decades. The trend of increase
of polarization is permanent, except in 1988. As illustrated in Table 2, the evolution of bipolar-
ization allows us ton divide the countries into two different economic groups. The first group
(quoted 1) comprises the countries which remain below the regional per capita GDP during all
the periods 1966-1976-1985-1993-2003-2008. Within this group are countries as Benin, Burkina-
Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, The Gambia,
Togo, and so forth. The group 2 (quoted 2) is the set of countries that have their level of GDP
per capita higher the regional one during all the period: Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, South
Africa, and so forth. Consequently, with the exception of Gabon and Congo, we can suppose
that we have three geographical groups: the sub- Saharan countries, the Maghreb countries,
and the Southern African countries. The growing bipolarization means that the development
of the first two groups of countries does not have visible and direct effect on the remaining
countries. It means also that there are not very tight economic relationships, such as mobility
of the factors or international exchanges, between these two groups and the rest of the countries
in the continent. In Table 2, scoring 12 means the country is going from group 1 to group 2,
and 21 means the opposite.
Insert Table 2
Two groups transition patterns
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3.2 Explanatory elements of bipolarization
In the previous section, the African regions are divided into two groups according to their per
capita GDP. Nevertheless, there are other national characteristics, besides per capita GDP,
that may explain polarization. For purposes of capturing those characteristics, we estimate
the polarization index on the value added of the four sectors: agriculture, mining, industries,
and services in order to understand the dynamics of global polarization. The sectors with the
greatest bipolarization levels are mining and services. This implies that natural resources make
the countries different. We run the following simple dynamic estimation:
GIt = F (APt, APt−1,MPt, IPt, IPt−1, SPt, SPt−1) (2)
Where F is a function, t stands for the time, GIt is the global index at time t, APt is the
polarization index in agriculture, MPt is the polarization index in mining sector, IPt is the
polarization index for industries and SPt is the index for services. OLS estimates are reported
in Table 3
Insert Table 3
Determinants of bipolarization
The main sectors that tend to reduce bipolarization are mining and the services. Agriculture
and industries and their lagged bipolarization level, contribute to enhance the global clustering
between the African countries. Mines and the services tend to reduce bipolarization. It is
possible to run other regressions by changing the variable or by supposing nonlinearities in the
relation. But the simple model emphasizes that most of the African countries have similarities
in services and mines.
4 Measuring the macroeconomic polarization
In this section, we present the axioms of the index of polarization that we use to measure the
global polarization in Africa. Let us call basic densities the density functions that are not
normalized (by population), symmetric, with only one mode, and have compact and disjoint
supports. It is possible to express the polarization index from axioms based on these basic
densities. Taking as a variable of interest income, Duclos et al. (2004) propose the following
axioms that give a particular form of the index. Let us define a t-squeeze of f as follows:
f t(x) = t−1f(t−1[x− (1− s)µ]) (3)
f being a basic density with mean µ and let t ∈ (0, 1]. The t-squeeze is a mean-preserving
reduction of the spread of f .
A-1 If a distribution has only a single density function, then a squeeze of that density can-
not increase polarization. This means that from a basic density, we can obtain another
distribution, the latter being obtained by “squeezing” the two sides of the first density.
This compression reduces alienation and the difference between individuals, which has
a negative impact on polarization. In addition, it has the positive effect of increasing
identification. Both effects must be offset.
Insert Figure 5
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A-2 If a symmetric distribution is composed of three basic densities derived from the same ker-
nel, with mutually disjoint supports, then a symmetrical squeeze of the two side densities
does not reduce the polarization. Thus a local squeezing does not reduce the polarization.
This means that if two distributions F and G have the same mean and the same median
(denoted m) and F stochastically dominates G in the second order in the interval [0,m]
and [m,∞], then F should be more polarized than G. Notice that the kernel is the function
used to approximate the density function of a variable. It is Gaussian if the function of
the normal distribution is used.
Insert Figure 6
A-3 If a symmetric distribution is composed of four basic densities derived from the same ker-
nel, with mutually disjoint supports, lateral sliding in opposite directions, both increases
the density of the medium polarization. Thus, the increase in inequality between groups
generates a greater polarization. In the case of polarization, this means that if a distribu-
tion, the income of each individual is away from the median, as it is higher or lower, then
the bias should increase.
Insert Figure 7
A-4 If we have P (F ) ≥ P (G) and p a positive real, then P (pF ) ≥ P (pG) where P is the
polarization index. If a distribution is more polarized than another one, that situation
remains when the scales of the two populations are reduced or increased in the same
order. These axioms lead to a particular form of P (F ). Consider a population composed
of G groups and normalized to unity. F is the cumulative density curve of the distribution
of income across the population and Fj is the non-normalized one of the group j : F (x) =∑
j Fj(x). F and fj denote the densities of the distributions and I = λj(x, F ), is the
identification function of each individual j, A = δjk(x, y) is the alienation of j towards
group k.
The polarization index measures the overall antagonisms of all individuals. The antago-
nism is the alienation weighted by the identification. The function T (I, A) that can be
measured is defined by:
P (F ) =
∑
j
∑
k
∫
x
∫
y
T (I,A) dFj(x)dFk(y) (4)
Assuming that G = 1, the distribution is represented by basic densities f. A measure of
the polarization P is given by:
Pα(F ) =
∫
x
∫
y
f(x)1+αf(y)|y − x| dxdy (5)
The parameter α reflects the weight given to the identification and we have α ∈ [0.25, 1].
The index described in equation (5) can be rewritten as
Pα(F ) =
∫
y
f(y)αa(y) dF (y)
where a(y) is given by
a(y) =
∫ +∞
−∞
|y − x|f(x) dx = µ+ y(2F (y)− 1)− 2B(y) (6)
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where µ denotes the average, and
B(y) =
∫ y
−∞
xf(x) dx (7)
The index Pα(F ) has several advantages, including the fact that it can be used for survey
data. For its statistical estimation, the variable of interest is divided into groups whose
sizes are estimated non-parametrically by the kernel method. The advantage is that it is
not useful to identify the form or the nature of the distribution function. If the variable
of interest is derived from a sample of n independent identically distributed observations,
then polarization index is estimated by:
Pα(F ) =
∫
fˆ(y)αaˆ(y) dFˆ (y) =
1
n
∑
i=1
nfˆi(y)αaˆ(yi) (8)
where yi is the quantile for values between (i − 1)/n and i/n. The average of these two
limits is taken to evaluate F :
Fˆ (yi) =
1
2n
(2i− 1) (9)
with
aˆ(yi) = µˆ+ yi(2Fˆi − 1)− 1
n
2 i−1∑
j=1
yj + yi
 (10)
and
Bˆ(yi) =
1
n
 i−1∑
j=1
yj +
i− (i− 1)
2
yi
 (11)
The distribution is estimated by the method of Gaussian kernel and it is shown that the
distribution of
√
n
(
Pˆα(Fˆ )− Pα(F )
)
follows an asymptotic N(0, Vα) whose variance is:
Vα = Var
f(y)
[
(1 + α)f(y)αa(y) + y
∫
f(x)1+α dx+ 2
∫ ∞
y
(x− y)f(x)1+αdx
]
(12)
Let us denote i¯α and a¯ the averages of the identification and the alienation, and by ρ their
standard covariance. The polarization index is written as:
PDERα (f) = i¯αa¯(1 + ρ). (13)
Insert Figure 8
Evolution of GDP per capita polarization index
Figure 8 displays the polarization index of GDP per capita. This polarization is globally
increasing over time, reflecting a kind of persistence of the phenomenon over time. Remind
that polarization is inequality of development. As a result, Figure 8 suggests that inequality
in development is increasing over time among African economies, meaning that some countries
are performing well independently of other. In what follows, we go a step further and study the
relation of this polarization to innovation for African economies.
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5 Innovation and polarization
In this section, we study the role of innovation in polarization process of African economies. The
role of innovation in development was studied in both the theoretical and the empirical literature
of economic growth. Fagerberg et al. (2010) provide an interesting review. Especially in the
literature on endogenous growth, these studies emphasize the role of R&D and human capital
as drivers of economic growth and development. To this end, the two facets of R&D were often
cited: R&D as stimulating innovation and as a facilitator of imitation (Griffith et al., 2004).
However, if several studies have examined the case of poor countries in general, the situation of
African countries has received very little attention. Here we study not the role of R&D (which
is an input to innovation), but the role of two outputs of innovation in the polarization process
of African economies: namely patents and trademarks.
Patents and trademarks are two indicators of innovation whose functions are distinct, but
with some similarities. Patents have been developed and studied extensively in developed coun-
tries. Some countries like China today arouse enthusiasm. We know that the patenting process
is particularly compelling, long and heavy depending on country’s legal procedure. It is there-
fore very difficult for poor countries to access them easily. Instead, trademarks have a much
simpler protocol and are more accessible. It is therefore interesting to relate these two modes
of innovation, to study their respective contributions to outcome. In a first step, we return to a
general overview on patents and trademarks. Then we give a brief description for the data under
use and last, we provide an estimate of the contribution of both indicators is the polarization of
these economies.
5.1 Overall overview on patents and trademarks
The Patent variables are the applications filed with a national patent office for exclusive rights
for an invention. An invention is considered as a product or a process that provides new ways
of doing something or offers new technical solutions to a problem. A patent provides protection
for the invention to the owner of the patent for a limited period, generally 20 years.
A resident patent application is one for which the first-named applicant or assignee is a
resident of the country concerned. Non-resident patent application is from an applicant who is
outside the country. The consequence is that the resident filings can overestimate the number of
new inventions. But they are a reliable indicator of underlying inventive activity. Patent filings
by non-residents mean the internationalization of technology and markets. Generally, because of
commercial considerations, applicants decide to file a patent application for the same invention
in other countries. The sectors where patents are developed, are: electricity and electronics
(electrical devices, engineering, audio-visual technology), instruments (optics, analysis, mea-
surement, control technology), chemistry and pharmaceuticals (biotechnology, agriculture and
food), process engineering (materials processing, textiles, paper, agricultural and food process-
ing), machinery, mechanics and transport, (machine tools, mechanical components), consumer
goods and civil engineering (equipment, building, mining).
a) An increase of worldwide patents applications
The patent activities still remain concentrated in high-income countries, though growth
in applications from middle- and low-income economies appears in the past decade. His-
torically the numbers of patents applications stood stable until the 1970s, but substantial
growth appears in the applications from Brazil, China and India, from the mid-1990s.
There are three reasons for the increase of patents applications in the world since the mid-
10
1990s. i) The acceleration of technological progress (essentially computer technology), that
may generate greater economic prosperity, ii) the changing nature of innovation systems
and companies’ shifting patenting strategies, iii) the increase of international trade and
the heightened need for companies to protect their inventions. The fact show that between
1995 and 2008, patent applications grew by 4.9% a year while they were of 3.7% growth
in 1983-1990 (WIPO, 2011).
b) Relevance of trademarks for innovation and development
The Trademark variables are also applications filed for registration of a trademark with a
national or regional trademark office. Trademarks are distinctive signs that identify goods
or services as those produced or provided by a specific economic agent. Trademarks protect
owners of the mark by ensuring exclusive right to use it to identify goods or services or to
authorize its use in return for payment. Trademarks can be maintained indefinitely as long
as the trademark holder pays the renewal fees. An estimated 3.66 million applications were
filed globally, consisting of 2.78 million resident and 0.88 million non-resident applications.
The growth of the applications is of about 12% in 2010 - the largest growth since 2000 -
after having declined over the previous two years.
Unlike patents, Middle-income countries file a higher number of trademark applications
per GDP than high income countries. There has been a growing trend of total trademark
applications in the world, between 1985 and 2007. An average of 31% of all trademark
applications from 1985 to 2010 was filed by non-resident applicants. However, since 2007,
this share has decreased from 30% to 24% because of the large number of resident trade-
mark applications in China. The main sectors of trademark applications are Agricultural
products and services ( 15.4%), Scientific research, Information and Communication tech-
nology (14%), Textiles - Clothing and Accessories (13.7%), Leisure, Education, Training:
(11.5%), Management, Communications, Real estate and Financial services (11.1%).
As is the case for patents, differences in trademark activity across economies reflect their
size. Trademarks applications are relevant as innovation indicators for developing coun-
tries. Particularly, they mean growing trade activities, firm performance, and they can
lead to catching up economies, leading to a reduction of global polarization and inequality
among countries (Centi and Rubio, 2005) It is worth noting that trademarks and patents
are not separate and independent variables. They may have many interactions. For exam-
ple, trademarks can reinforce the protection provided to patented goods, and in a sense
prolonging the protection originally provided by the patents, and contributing then to the
financial return obtained from inventions. There also are benefits from trademark informa-
tion in the provision of commercial insights to complement the information obtained from
patents . Then there exist a synergism between the patent and the trademark applications
(Rujas, 1999).
Trademarks have also social benefits as they help identify the quality of goods for con-
sumers. Essentially, trademarks reduce the purchase errors and the costs of attempting to
avoid such errors. However, several forms of social costs are associated with trademarks,
as shown by Greer (1979) who studied a model where he suggested that identification of
quality and source be separated wherever possible, in the maximization of benefits and the
minimization of costs. Private benefits can also rise from trademarks (Chudnovsky, 1979),
especially for the developing countries hosting non resident trademark applications.
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5.2 Distribution of patents and trademarks
We present the distribution of the two categories of variables in Table 4. What is remarkable is
that South Africa dominates the entire African continent, where during all the period from 1960
to 2008, the number of applications are respectively: 159,477 and 339,437 for the patents and
trademarks of non residents; 86,816 and 379,388 for the patents and trademarks of residents.
The patents of residents are relatively more important for South Africa than the ones of non
residents. The same observation can be made for the trademark. The numbers of patents of
residents and non residents are higher in North Africa than in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding
South Africa.
Insert Table 4
Distribution of the patents and trademarks in the African regions
In North Africa, the highest numbers of non residents patents are found in Egypt Arab
Republic (19,032), Algeria (6,841) and Morroco (6,365); the same for Kenya (1,134) and Nigeria
(677) in sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa. The countries within the two regions that
have the highest levels of residents patents are the Egypt Arab Republic (8,169) and Morroco
(1,502). In the entire continent, residents trademarks are very important, mainly in Morroco
(34,411), Algeria (19,830), Kenya (8,258), Tunisia (6,699), Egypt (2,972) and Mali (2,888). It
is worth noting that Tunisia (14,067) and Kenya (11,905) have the highest numbers of non
residents trademarks.
After having studied the cross correlation of the polarization indices, we see that the relation-
ship between GDP and patents from non residents is substantially positive with one. It means
that the two series have a delayed link. It is worth noting that there is a negative relation five
years later. The correlation between GDP and patents of non residents is always negative and
is strong with two years delay. Contrarily, the relation between GDP and patents of residents
is almost always negative with a strong level after two years delay.
We plot in Figures 9 and 10 the evolution over time of the polarization indices of patents
and trademarks. Two salient features can be put forward in the evolution of patents (Figure 9).
Before 1994, while the patent index for residents is stable and above that of non residents, the
latter is increasing until reaching the former and going above. The second feature is that there
is the sharp decline in 1997 and 2006 meaning the inequality has narrowed both for residents
and non residents with a very strong magnitude for residents. As for trademarks (Figure 10),
residents index is also dominates non residents and the sharp decline hold in 1985.
Insert Figure 9
Evolution of GDP per capita and patents index
Insert Figure 10
Evolution of GDP per capita and trademarks index
5.3 Estimation
Several studies have investigated the innovation-development relation for developing countries.
Chen and Puttitanun (2005) studied the relationship between IPRs and economic development
using a panel data for developing countries. Their IPRs measure is the the GP index developed
by Park and Ginarte (1997). This index is composed of five patents laws from 64 developing
countries: duration of protection, extent of coverage, membership in international patent agree-
ments, provisions for loss of protection, and enforcement measures. The index scale ranges from
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0 to 5, with higher numbers reflecting stronger levels of protection. Chen and Puttitanun (2005)
considered a system of two triangular simultaneous equation system, one for IPRs protection and
one for domestic innovation, where IPRs is treated as endogenous. The control variables include
GDP, squared GDP, education, trade, dummy variable for WTO membership. The innovation
indicator considered by Chen and Puttitanun (2005) is patents applications. Consistently with
their theoretical framework, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) found evidence that innovations in
developing countries are positively and significantly impacted by IPRs, and the levels of IPRs
display a U-shaped relationship with per capita GDP.
The approach adopted here is rather different. As we have indicated above, our goal is to
analyze the determinants of the polarization of innovation in African countries within a time
series framework. It is worth to notice that R&D expenditures have been used as measure
of innovation, which is rather measure the input of innovation. Other measures of innovation
are the number of patent applications and/or patents granted, and trademarks, which are in-
ventive outputs. As documented earlier, trademarks are particularly relevant in developing
countries. This raises several questions: Do catching-up economies experience an increase in
resident trademark applications prior to an increase in resident patent applications? what is the
relation between trademarks and trade? To what extent do trade flows correspond to flows in
trademark registrations? In this empirical investigation, we consider both polarization index of
patents and trademarks as innovation variables of interest. Accordingly, it is desirable that the
analysis is conducted jointly. VAR models suited well this purpose. The general VAR model
with exogenous variables is written as
yt = AYt−1 +B0xt + ut (14)
where yt, is the K × 1 vector of endogenous variables, here polarization index of trademarks
and patents for residents and non-residents, meaning that K = 4, A is a K × Kp matrix of
coefficients, B0 is a K ×M matrix of coefficients, xt is the M × 1 vector of exogenous variables
(polarization index of GDP, openness, remittances and revenue), ut is the K× 1 vector of white
noise innovations andYt =
(
yt, · · · ,yt−p+1
)′. The variable Revenue is all the central government
revenues as percentage of GDP, excluding grants. The variable Remittances includes all the
transfers made by migrants who are employed or intend to remain employed for more than a
year in another economy in which they are considered as residents. It is also taken as percentage
of the GDP. The Openness is the sum of the exports and imports divided by the GDP. All these
amounts are in constant 2000 US dollars. It worthwhile noticing that other controls that one
would like to include in the analysis are R&D expenditures and higher education. Clearly,
both can be viewed as relevant innovation inputs. However, data on R&D expenditures are not
available for most developing countries. Moreover, for the sample at hand, higher education
data are not available. The data are drawn from the World Bank Africa Database (2007 and
2010).
Equation (14) is estimated by maximum likelihood (Lu¨tkepohl, 2005 and Hamilton, 1994).
Parameters estimates are reported in Table 5. Four blocks of estimation appear in this table,
each corresponding to a measure of polarization index of patent and trademark. The notations
L1 and l2 indicate the lags at order 1 and 2 to of the corresponding variables. As indicated in
the Chi-square specification test, non-residents trademark equation is not significant. By cons,
residents trademark equation shows a global significance at the conventional level of 5%. Despite
this, only the lag 2 for non-residents trademarks has a significant positive effect on residents
trademark. Recall that the variables used here are the polarization index. In other words,
13
the polarization index of residents trademarks increases with that of non-residents trademarks.
Regarding patents, the chi-square specification test indicates that both equations are significant
at 5% and 1% respectively for residents and non-residents. Thus, while the polarization index of
patents residents increases with the lag 1 for patent non-residents, the lag 2 of the same reduced
this polarization. At the same time, we observe in the last equation that the patents filed
by residents contribute to reduce the polarization observed in patents filed by non-residents.
Finally, an increase of the polarization index in the openness and remittances increases the
polarization of non-residents patents.
Insert Table 5
VAR estimation results: Determinants of innovation in Africa
Table 6 reported the impulse response function (IRF). The IRF measures the effect of a
shock to an endogenous variable on itself or on another endogenous variable (see Lu¨tkepohl,
2005, pp. 51-63, and Hamilton, 1994, pp. 318-323, for formal definitions). I particular, here we
report the estimates of the cumulative dynamic multipliers, which describe the impact of a unit
change in an exogenous variable on each endogenous over time. We also reported 95% lower and
upper bounds. The results indicate that the cumulative dynamic multipliers are significant.
Insert Table 6
Impulse response function: Cumulative dynamic-multiplier
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the degree of polarization in the per capita GDP distribution in the African
countries between 1966 and 2004 from complementary approaches. We begin primarily by a
nonparametric analysis. We find that African countries tend to cluster into two classes over the
period. However, the level of intra-distribution mobility, is low and can be attributed mainly to
the sub-Saharan countries. Indeed, the geographical location of the countries plays an important
role in the explanation of the bi-polarization patterns. Secondly, we construct the evolution of the
level of polarization over time, completing the nonparametric approach by using the methodology
proposed by Wolfson (1994). The results reveal a growing bipolarization. The Maghreb Arab
countries and the southern African countries constitute a cluster, while the sub-Saharan countries
make up a second one. The growth of polarization is related to countries’ specialization during
the period. Essentially, its evolution is the outcome of agriculture and industry. Therefore
development policies for services and mining sectors may be very useful in decreasing polarization
in Africa. Lastly, while establishing the link between patents and trademarks, our study does
not detect the determinants of trademarks. However, one might think that trademarks play
an important role in developing economies. Further analysis including data collection might
be necessary to target such determinants like the role institutions in African economies aiming
at facilitating the development and the management of trademarks. A firm level analysis may
deserve attention.
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Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Transition probability matrices
GDP 1976
# Countries GDP 1966 [0.6, 1) [1, 1.4] Total
25 [0.6, 1) 0.735 0 0.735
9 [1, 1.4] 0.059 0.206 0.265
34 Total 0.794 0.206 1
GDP 1985
# Countries GDP 1976 [0.6, 1) [1, 1.4] Total
27 [0.6, 1) 0.676 0.118 0.794
7 [1, 1.4] 0.029 0.176 0.206
34 Total 0.706 0.294 1
GDP 1996
# Countries GDP 1985 [0.6, 1) [1, 1.4] Total
24 [0.6, 1) 0.706 0 0.706
10 [1, 1.4] 0.029 0.265 0.294
34 Total 0.735 0.265 1
GDP 2003
# Countries GDP 1996 [0.6, 1) [1, 1.4] Total
25 [0.6, 1) 0.735 0 0.735
9 [1, 1.4] 0.029 0.235 0.265
34 Total 0.765 0.235 1
GDP 2008
# Countries GDP 2003 [0.6, 1) [1, 1.4] Total
26 [0.6, 1) 0.676 0.029 0,764
8 [1, 1.4] 0 0.235 0.235
34 Total 0.676 0.264 1
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Table 2: Two groups transition patterns
Countries 1976 1985 1996 2003 2008
Burundi 1 1 1 1 1
Benin 1 1 1 1 1
Burkina Faso 1 1 1 1 1
Botswana 1 12 2 2 2
Central A Republic 1 1 1 1 1
Ivory Coast 2 1 1 1 1
Cameroon 1 12 21 1 1
Congo 21 2 2 21 2
Algeria 2 2 2 2 2
Egypt 1 12 2 2 2
Gabon 2 2 2 2 2
Ghana 1 1 1 1 1
Gambie, The 1 1 1 1 1
Kenya 1 1 1 1 1
Liberia 21 1 1 1 1
Lesotho 1 1 1 1 1
Morroco 2 2 2 2 2
Madagascar 1 1 1 1 1
Mauritania 1 1 1 1 1
Malawi 1 1 1 1 1
Niger 1 1 1 1 1
Nigeria 1 1 1 1 1
Rwanda 1 1 1 1 1
Soudan 1 1 1 1 1
Senegal 1 1 1 1 1
Sierra Leone 1 1 1 1 1
Seychelles 2 2 2 2 2
Chad 1 1 1 1 1
Togo 1 1 1 1 1
Tunisia 2 2 2 2 2
South Africa 2 2 2 2 2
Zanzibar 1 1 1 1 1
Zambia 1 1 1 1 1
Zimbabwe 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 3: Determinants of bipolarization: OLS estimation
Variable Coef. Std. Err.
APt 0.034∗∗∗ 0.009
APt−1 0.043∗∗∗ 0.010
MPt -0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0002
MPt−1 -0.0004∗∗ 0.0002
IPt 0.0006 0.002
IPt−1 0.006∗∗∗ 0.002
SPt 0.002 0.005
SPt−1 -0.005 0.002
# Obs. 32
R¯2 0.998
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% , ∗∗ : 5% , ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 4: Distribution of the patents and trademarks in the African regions (percentage)
Regions Patents Patents Trademarks Trademarks
non residents residents non residents residents
North Africa 22.776 13.067 18.040 16.846
Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa 6.088 1.383 28.675 8.517
South Africa 71.135 85.548 53.283 74.637
Total 100 1000 100 100
Table 5: VAR estimation results: Determinants of innovation in
Africa
Equation & Variable Coef. Std. Err.
Trademarks Residents
L1.Trademarks Residents -0.349 0.327
L2.Trademarks Residents 0.005 0.255
L1.Trademarks non-Residents 0.587∗∗∗ 0.188
L2.Trademarks non-Residents 0.342 0.214
L1.Patents Residents -0.125 0.153
L2.Patens Residents -0.233 0.147
L1.Patents non-Residents 0.009 0.259
L2.Patents non-Residents 0.102 0.252
GDP per capita -1.175 2.767
Openness -0.039 0.205
Remittances -0.094 0.501
Revenue -0.440 0.614
Intercept 0.477 0.508
Trademarks non-Residents
L1.Trademarks Residents -0.040 0.632
L2.Trademarks Residents -0.295 0.494
L1.Trademarks non-Residents 0.075 0.362
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 5 – continued
Equation & Coef. Std. Err.
L2.Trademarks non-Residents 0.188 0.414
L1.Patents Residents 0.001 0.295
L2.Patens Residents 0.006 0.285
L1.Patents non-Residents 0.007 0.500
L2.Patents non-Residents 0.007 0.486
GDP per capita 2.664 5.347
Openness -0.275 0.396
Remittances -0.679 0.969
Revenue 0.207 1.187
Intercept -0.272 0.982
Patents Residents
L1.Trademarks Residents 0.625 0.511
L2.Trademarks Residents 0.002 0.399
L1.Trademarks non-Residents -0.107 0.293
L2.Trademarks non-Residents -0.490 0.335
L1.Patents Residents -0.081 0.238
L2.Patens Residents 0.512∗∗ 0.230
L1.Patents non-Residents 1.039∗∗∗ 0.404
L2.Patents non-Residents -0.837∗∗ 0.393
GDP per capita -5.750 4.322
Openness 0.190 0.320
Remittances 0.996 0.783
Revenue 1.193 0.960
Intercept 0.953 0.794
Patents non-Residents
L1.Trademarks Residents -0.093 0.236
L2.Trademarks Residents -0.058 0.184
L1.Trademarks non-Residents 0.148 0.135
L2.Trademarks non-Residents 0.001 0.154
L1.Patents Residents -0.252∗∗ 0.110
L2.Patens Residents 0.069 0.106
L1.Patents non-Residents 0.605∗∗∗ 0.186
L2.Patents non-Residents -0.182 0.181
GDP per capita -2.950 1.992
Openness 0.456∗∗∗ 0.148
Remittances 2.107∗∗∗ 0.361
Revenue 0.501 0.442
Intercept 0.195 0.366
Sample 1982-2008
Log likelihood 356.128
AIC -22.528
HQIC -21.785
SBIC -20.032
Specification test χ2 p > χ2
Trademarks Residents 23.700 0.022
Trademarks non-Residents 2.734 0.997
Patents Residents 21.576 0.042
Patents non-Residents 85.452 0.000
Significance levels : ∗: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%
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Figure 1: Distribution of GDP per capita
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Figure 2: Contour of distribution of GDP per capita [Top (a)]: Maghreb countries. [Bottom-left
(b)]: South African countries. [Bottom-right]: Sub-Saharan countries
27
Population share0.5
0
1
L(F )
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
as
h
ar
e
Figure 3: The bipolarization index
Bi
po
lar
iza
tio
n i
nd
ex
 of
 G
DP
year
1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2008
.054857
.090556
Figure 4: Evolution of the Wolfson bipolarization index of GDP
28
ff t
x
Figure 5: A single squeeze of a density function and the reduction of polarization
f3
x
f t2f
t
1
f1 f2
Figure 6: A symmetric slide of the density functions and the rise of polarization
f ′1
f1 f2 f
′
2
x
Figure 7: A double squeeze and the increase of polarization
29
Po
lar
iza
tio
n 
ind
ex
 of
 G
DP
year
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
.226986
.236472
Figure 8: Evolution of GDP per capita polarization index
Pa
te
nt
s r
es
ide
nts
year
 Patents non residents  Patents residents
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
.114157
.219653
Figure 9: Evolution of GDP per capita and patents index
30
Ta
de
ma
rks
 re
sid
en
ts
year
 Tademarks non residents  Tademarks residents
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
.099337
.202893
Figure 10: Evolution of GDP per capita and trademarks index
31
   
The UNU‐MERIT WORKING Paper Series 
 
2012-01 Maastricht reflections on innovation by Luc Soete 
2012-02 A  methodological  survey  of  dynamic  microsimulation  models  by  Jinjing  Li  and  
Cathal O'Donoghue 
2012-03 Evaluating binary alignment methods  in microsimulation models by  Jinjing Li and  
Cathal O'Donoghue 
2012-04 Estimates of the value of patent rights in China by Can Huang 
2012-05 The impact of malnutrition and post traumatic stress disorder on the performance 
of working memory in children by Elise de Neubourg and Chris de Neubourg 
2012-06 Cross‐national trends  in permanent earnings  inequality and earnings  instability  in 
Europe 1994‐2001 by Denisa Maria Sologon and Cathal O'Donoghue 
2012-07 Foreign aid transaction costs by Frieda Vandeninden 
2012-08 A simulation of social pensions in Europe by Frieda Vandeninden 
2012-09 The informal ICT sector and innovation processes in Senegal by Almamy Konté and 
Mariama Ndong 
2012-10 The  monkey  on  your  back?!  Hierarchical  positions  and  their  influence  on 
participants'  behaviour  within  communities  of  learning  by  Martin  Rehm,  Wim 
Gijselaers and Mien Segers 
2012-11 Do Ak models really lack transitional dynamics? by Yoseph Yilma Getachew 
2012-12 The  co‐evolution  of  organizational  performance  and  emotional  contagion  by  R. 
Cowan, N. Jonard, and R.Weehuizen 
2012-13 "Surfeiting,  the  appetite  may  sicken":  Entrepreneurship  and  the  happiness  of 
nations by Wim Naudé, José Ernesto Amorós and Oscar Cristi 
2012-14 Social interactions and complex networks by Daniel C. Opolot 
2012-15 New  firm  creation  and  failure:  A  matching  approach  by  Thomas  Gries,  Stefan 
Jungblut and Wim Naudé 
2012-16 Gains  from  child‐centred Early Childhood Education: Evidence  from a Dutch pilot 
programme by Robert Bauchmüller 
2012-17 Highly skilled temporary return, technological change and Innovation: The Case of 
the TRQN Project in Afghanistan by Melissa Siegel and Katie Kuschminder 
2012-18 New Technologies in remittances sending: Opportunities for mobile remittances in 
Africa Melissa Siegel and Sonja Fransen 
2012-19 Implementation  of  cross‐country  migration  surveys  in  conflict‐affected  settings: 
Lessons  from  the  IS  Academy  survey  in  Burundi  and  Ethiopia  by  Sonja  Fransen, 
Katie Kuschminder and Melissa Siegel 
2012-20 International  entrepreneurship  and  technological  capabilities  in  the Middle  East 
and North Africa by Juliane Brach and Wim Naudé 
2012-21 Entrepreneurship, stages of development, and industrialization by Zoltan J. Ács and 
Wim Naudé 
2012-22 Innovation strategies and employment  in Latin American  firms by Gustavo Crespi 
and Pluvia Zuniga 
2012-23 An  exploration  of  agricultural  grassroots  innovation  in  South  Africa  and 
implications for innovation indicator development by Brigid Letty, Zanele Shezi and 
Maxwell Mudhara 
2012-24 Employment  effect  of  innovation:  microdata  evidence  from  Bangladesh  and 
Pakistan by Abdul Waheed 
2012-25 Open  innovation,  contracts,  and  intellectual  property  rights:  an  exploratory 
empirical study by John Hagedoorn and Ann‐Kristin Ridder 
2012-26 Remittances provide resilience against disasters in Africa by Wim Naudé and Henri 
Bezuidenhout 
2012-27 Entrepreneurship and economic development: Theory, evidence and policy by Wim 
Naudé 
2012-28 Whom to target ‐ an obvious choice? by Esther Schüring and Franziska Gassmann 
2012-29 Sunk  costs,  extensive R&D  subsidies  and  permanent  inducement  effects  by  Pere 
Arqué‐Castells and Pierre Mohnen 
2012-30 Assessing contingent  liabilities  in public‐private partnerships (PPPs) by Emmanouil 
Sfakianakis and Mindel van de Laar 
2012-31 Informal knowledge exchanges under complex social relations: A network study of 
handloom clusters in Kerala, India by Robin Cowan  and Anant Kamath 
2012-32 Proximate,  intermediate  and  ultimate  causality:  Theories  and  experiences  of 
growth and development by Adam Szirmai 
2012-33 Institutions and long‐run growth performance: An analytic literature review of the 
institutional determinants of economic growth by Richard Bluhm and Adam Szirmai 
2012-34 Techniques  for dealing with  reverse  causality between  institutions and economic 
performance by Luciana Cingolani and Denis de Crombrugghe 
2012-35 Preliminary  conclusions  on  institutions  and  economic  performance  by  Denis  de 
Crombrugghe and Kristine Farla 
2012-36 Stylized facts of governance, institutions and economic development. Exploring the 
institutional profiles database by Bart Verspagen 
2012-37 Exploring  the  Panel  Components  of  the  Institutional  Profiles  Database  (IPD)  by 
Luciana Cingolani and Denis de Crombrugghe 
2012-38 Institutions and credit by Kristine Farla 
2012-39 Industrial policy for growth by Kristine Farla 
2012-40 Explaining  the  dynamics  of  stagnation:  An  empirical  examination  of  the  North, 
Wallis  and  Weingast  approach  by  Richard  Bluhm,  Denis  de  Crombrugghe  and 
Adam Szirmai 
2012-41 The  importance  of  manufacturing  in  economic  development:  Past,  present  and 
future perspectives by Wim Naudé and Adam Szirmai 
2012-42 Lords of Uhuru: the political economy of elite competition and institutional change 
in post‐independence Kenya by Biniam Bedasso 
2012-43 Employment and wages of people living with HIV/AIDS by Pilar García‐Gómez, José 
M. Labeaga and Juan Oliva 
2012-44 Prescriptions  for  network  strategy:  Does  evidence  of  network  effects  in  cross‐
section support them? by Joel A.C. Baum, Robin Cowan and Nicolas Jonard 
2012-45 Perspectives  on  human  development  theory  in  democracy  promotion:  A 
comparison of democracy promotion programmes  in Egypt  through  the  lenses of 
classical and revised modernisation theory by Inger Karin Moen Dyrnes 
2012-46 Nonlinearities  in  productivity  growth:  A  semi‐parametric  panel  analysis  by 
Théophile T. Azomahou, Bity Diene and Mbaye Diene 
2012-47 Optimal  health  investment  with  separable  and  non‐separable  preferences  by 
Théophile T. Azomahou, Bity Diene, Mbaye Diene and Luc Soete 
2012-48 Income  polarization  and  innovation:  Evidence  from  African  economies  by 
Théophile T. Azomahou and Mbaye Dien 
